The Secret Service agent in charge of Donald Trump’s July 13 rally in Butler, Pa., was made aware of “credible intelligence” of a threat against the former president — but didn’t pass it along to her supervisor or others planning security for the event, a Senate report on the assassination attempt found.
The 94-page report on the shooting, released by the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee and Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Wednesday, determined that the Secret Service’s lead advance agent for the Trump rally wrote in a security planning document that there was “no adverse intelligence” concerning the 45th president’s visit to Butler – despite being notified of an unspecified threat.
Furthermore, the lead agent told Senate investigators that she notified the special agent in charge [SAIC] of the Secret Service’s Pittsburgh field office about the “credible intelligence” before the rally – but he claims that never happened.
Had the Pittsburgh SAIC known about the potential threat to Trump, the rally at the Butler Farm Show Grounds may have been moved indoors, he told investigators.
Despite the damning findings, the lead agent and 11 other members of the Secret Service interviewed by investigators refused to accept responsibility for any of the numerous security failures identified in the report.
The failures resulted in the death of rallygoer Corey Comperatore, 50; critical injuries to rally attendees David Dutch, 57, and James Copenhaver, 74; and the 78-year-old former president being shot in the ear after would-be assassin Thomas Matthew Crooks, 20, opened fire from the American Glass Research building rooftop.
“Credible intelligence” of a threat
Secret Service counter snipers – including the one who shot and killed Crooks after having him in his sights only “mere seconds” before firing – were sent to Butler in direct response to the threat intelligence, investigators found.
Their fortunate deployment marked the first time that a Secret Service counter-sniper team has ever been assigned to cover an event for someone other than the president, vice president, or a formally nominated presidential candidate (Trump was the presumptive GOP nominee at the time of the rally).
The Secret Service’s assistant director of the office of protective operations told investigators that officials at the agency determined “prior to July 5” that counter snipers would be present at all outdoor events for Trump “going forward.”
“In his interview with the Committee, the USSS Assistant Director for OPO said this decision was based on several factors including the size and scale of the former President’s outdoor events, his being on the cusp of becoming the nominee, and threat information, at least some of which is classified,” the report states.
“To date, the Committee has not been provided any additional detail related to the USSS’ decision,” it continues, noting that “only two of the USSS personnel the Committee has interviewed were made aware that there was a credible threat related to former President Trump prior to July 13, only one of which was made aware of the classified information underlying the threat.”
The report notes that the FBI has indicated Crooks “was not known” to the bureau prior to the assassination attempt.
“No adverse intelligence”
The Secret Service’s lead advance agent for the rally told investigators that on July 9 she received a phone call from the “second supervisor of the Trump detail” informing her that Secret Service counter snipers would be assigned to Butler because of “credible intel that he could not discuss further with her.”
The lead agent claims she asked the second supervisor to call her supervisor – the Pittsburgh field office SAIC – to discuss the “credible intel” but he refused.
“He said that there was credible intelligence that he could not speak about,” she told investigators.
“[I]t was information that he wasn’t able to pass,” she responded when asked why the second supervisor could not call the Pittsburgh SAIC.
“He did not use the word ‘classified’ on the phone, but from my general knowledge when you say that you cannot pass something on the phone, the understanding is that it’s classified and he can’t speak about it on the phone,” the lead agent added.
The agent claimed she went ahead and informed the Pittsburgh SAIC about the counter snipers that were being assigned “because the second supervisor expressed that there was credible Intelligence.”
The Pittsburgh SAIC appeared to dispute that such a conversation took place and said he first became aware of that counter snipers were coming “through an e-mail requesting housing for them,” according to the report.
“I did not even know a request was made,” he told investigators.
When asked if he knew why they were sent, he responded, “I don’t.”
The Pittsburgh SAIC noted that had he been made aware of the threat intelligence he “might have pushed for the event to be moved indoors if it was deemed too risky for an outdoor venue.”
“Additionally, the SAIC told the Committee that he would have requested more assets if he had received this information,” the report states.
On top of apparently not informing her Pittsburgh field office supervisor, the lead agent wrote in a preliminary Butler rally survey document that “[a]t this time, no adverse intelligence has been developed concerning this visit.”
“Any adverse intelligence that may arise will be passed on to all working supervisors,” she added.
When asked about the apparent falsehood she wrote on the document, the lead agent told investigators that it was her “understanding” that there was “no adverse intelligence to pass on to the group as a whole.”
“This is not all-encompassing as to intelligence,” she said of the document, “whether or not it can be passed.”
“If something classified, such as something that was not passed to me to begin with, then that would not be put in writing, as well,” she added. “It would’ve been passed to those that needed to know in this situation.”
Her supervisor, the Pittsburgh SAIC, noted that his expectation would be that “any credible threat or intelligence” would be included in the preliminary survey.
Assassination attempt was ‘foreseeable, preventable’
The Senate report concluded that Crooks’ ability to carry out the assassination attempt against Trump was “foreseeable” and “preventable” and the result of “failures in planning, communications, security, and allocation of resources” by the Secret Service.
“These included unclear roles and responsibilities, insufficient coordination with state and local law enforcement, the lack of effective communications, and inoperable [Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems systems], among many others,” according to the report.
The committee also discovered “siloed communications and coordination problems between federal, state, and local law enforcement officials” that “remain unaddressed” were also a factor in the failure to quickly respond to Crooks’ “suspicious” behavior before the shooting.
The report notes that at least eight Secret Service agents were made aware of a “suspicious” person with a rangefinder (Crooks) nearly a half hour before the shooting.
The report further notes that “key requests to FBI, DHS, ATF and [Secret Service] remain outstanding” and that the majority of documents provided to investigators were “heavily redacted.”
“This has unnecessarily hindered the Committee’s ability to carry out its constitutional authority to investigate and acquire information necessary to identify needed reforms,” the report states.
“These overly burdensome redactions, including of communications related to the same individuals who the Committee interviewed, only served to delay the Committee’s ability to conduct these interviews and carry out its investigation efficiently and effectively.”
